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ABSTRACT
The evaluation of a proposed submarine detection system by computer
war gaming techniques is illustrated by a hypothetical example. A
scenario is chosen, tactics and policies established, and the tactical
simulation conducted. From the results of the simulation, minimum
specifications for the system to attain a given level of effectiveness
are drawn. Finally, a scale is made for comparison of this system with
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Time a/c arrives on station
Time a/c goes off station
Length of legs (miles)
The number of legs to be flown in a prescribed pattern
Track spacing (miles)
Drop interval between probes (miles)
Field orientation (radians)
Number of submarines transiting the barrier in a given run
Relative course of the submarine to the field (radians)
Time from submarine detection until relief a/c arrives
on station
Cycle time, time between scheduled a/c launches
Width of wake or plan view of the wake diameter
Aircraft cost in terms of Dollars per Hour on station
Probe cost in terms of Dollars per Probe dropped
Readiness cost to maintain the alert status necessary for
DT = 2 in terms of Dollars per Day
Readiness cost to maintain the alert status necessary for
DT = 3 in terms of Dollars per Day

IINTRODUCTION
Progress in submarine developments has outstripped submarine
countermeasures to the extent that anti-submarine forces must now
look for quantum jumps in effectiveness. They are forced to develop
new techniques of detection or discover detection means which the
submarine cannot avoid or neutralize.
Submarine detection devices, or sensors, as they are commonly
termed, have become the nucleus around which the entire ASW force is
built. The modification of a primary sensor system calls for a re-
evaluation of both the force structure and the operating procedures.
Often the nature of the system dictates the nature of the vehicle which
will carry it. New systems sometimes require radical modifications of
the parent vehicle and, in extreme cases, require that a new craft be
built around the sensor.
Operational evaluation of new systems of this magnitude cannot
take place until enormous sums of money have been invested. Some defects
may not be evident in single plane operations but become significant with
a group as big as a squadron. Conceivably the nation could become
economically committed to dependence on a system before it has been
operationally tested. Proto-type installations and engineering mock-ups
are useful for pointing out design defects. However, other techniques
must be supplemented to determine operational specifications and to
make preliminary estimates of the effectiveness of the proposed system.
This paper proposes to show the use of a computer simulation of the tac-
tical employment of an undeveloped sensor system. By means of an example,

necessary specifications to make the system operationally effective will
be determined. A method for comparing this system with other systems
designed for similar purposes will be discussed.
A hypothetical physical phenomena which the submarine cannot
control will be proposed and a detector will be hypothesized. Descrip-
tions of the phenomena will be kept as general as possible so as to
impose minimum restraints on the engineering aspects of the develop-
ment. Similarly, many variables and possible limitations will be
omitted in the simulation. It is assumed that if any limitation proves
to be unduly detrimental, it can be avoided by engineering adjustments.
It must be emphasized that all numbers used as values of critical
parameters are just examples and have no implications of current equip-
ment capabilities or readiness states.
In Chapter II, the hypothetical physical phenomenon to be exploited
and the proposed sensor system are outlined. Chapter III contains a
description of the model, including the tactical considerations and
policies deemed necessary. The first section of Chapter IV is devoted
to testing the model under several variations of parameters. If the
overall results showed very little change with the variation of a par-
ticular parameter, that parameter was considered non-critical, a
"reasonable" value was selected for it, and it was held constant
thereafter. Similarly if a parameter had a "maximum" effectiveness at
some value over the range considered for all combinations, it was also
considered non-critical and held constant at this maximum value. In the
latter part of Chapter IV, the results of variations of the critical
parameters are discussed. In Chapter V, the effectiveness is cast in
terms of cost for comparison with similar systems.

II
CHARACTERIZATION OF NATURAL PHENOMENON
The submarine of primary concern is one of the long range or long
endurance type. In particular, a submarine equipped for launching
ballistic missiles is a major adversary. These types are inherently
very large and are built to travel at considerable depths. For this
problem, consider the sea water at these depths to form a stationary,
uniform body of liquid with little motion of its own. Such liquid
would show a sharp disturbance when an object as large as a submarine
passes through. The disturbance might take the form of a volume of
turbulent water, a departure from the expected pressure pattern, a
volume of ionized or otherwise chemically activated liquid, or a region
of residue from the boat itself. Regardless of its nature, each of these
disturbances will be assumed to have some common characteristics. First-
ly, it will be assumed that the disturbance, which will be referred to
as the "wake", is non-propulsive. In this respect a wake will be like
tracks left by a vehicle over sand. In other words, the wake will only
exist in water the submarine has traversed. The center of the wake will
exist only along the submarine's path (considered in three dimensions).
Secondly, it will be assumed that the disturbance will be propagated
radially at an even rate. The decrease in intensity can then be con-
sidered to be a function of the radial distance from the actual path of
the submarine. Now consider a sensor in the form of an expendable probe
which will sense a disturbance above a pre-set level. For this sensor,
or probe, the detection area can be assumed to be a cylindrical volume
centered on the submarine's path. The radius of the cylinder is

determined by the sensitivity of the probe. Thirdly, it is assumed
that the disturbance pattern will have a neutral or positive buoyancy.
And finally, the disturbance will be assumed to persist at a point at
the required level for detection as a function of time, independent of
the speed of the submarine or other propagation factors. This implies
that the disturbance behind .a submarine will exist at or above the
detection level threshold for a set length of time. How far the sub-
marine has traveled since it initiated the disturbance at that point
depends on the submarine's speed. Hence, the length of the wake at any
time is the product of the sub speed and the wake persistence. Thus,
the wake can be approximated by a long cylindrical volume behind the
submarine with the length of the cylinder being a function of the sub
speed, and the radius a function of the probe sensitivity.
The system description of "expendable probes" and the require-
ment that the probe be in contact with the wake for a detection
characterize aircraft launched detectors. It is, therefore, hypothesized
that a "Request For Proposal" be sent out for development of such a
system. With the RFP should go the operational specifications the
system must meet for it to show a significant improvement over current
systems. Cost limitations on the elements of the system to make it
competitive may be included. This paper will demonstrate the use of a
computer simulation to estimate these parameters.
The evaluation will assume that the probe system is being employed
to maintain a barrier of indefinite length. The barrier is situated so




DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
To make a descriptive simulation of the employment of a system, a
scenario is chosen, a tactical policy is prescribed, and assumed values
are assigned to the critical parameters. The concept of a passive
probe detecting some disturbance phenomena adapts ideally to a barrier
operation where the defending force is assigned to detect submarines
transiting through a fixed geographical area in a known direction. The
fixed geographical area might be defined by channel dimensions with the
direction of movement being from the submarine's home port to an obvious
operating region. In this model, the course is assumed to be within 30°
of the normal to the barrier area and normally distributed with the mean
being the perpendicular course. The density of transitor traffic must
be adjusted to avoid the forcing of misleading conclusions. In actual
practice, even in periods of increased tensions, the volume of such
traffic over a two or three day period would be very small. To estimate
such a small density would require exceptionally long playing periods to
get an "average" reaction to a transit. An increase in density might
cause the "dead time" occurring from the time of a contact until the
succeeding aircraft arrives on station to become an unduly dominant
factor. A density was selected which introduced, on the average, slight-
ly more transitors than scheduled patrol planes. This implies that the
area is not saturated with simultaneous transits occurring, but occasion-
ally a transit commences during a dead time interval.
The tactical plan calls for each aircraft to enter the area at a
specified entry point and fly a series of parallel legs, dropping probes

at specified drop intervals along each leg until the pattern is com-
pleted or until contact is made. If contact is made, the aircraft
reverses course and attempts to verify the contact with a series of
three closely spaced probes. If the contact is not verified, the air-
craft resumes the pattern. If the contact is verified, the aircraft
is considered to be committed to the localization and tracking of the
contact, and both the sub and the aircraft are dropped from further
consideration in the simulation. Accordingly, another aircraft is
launched to take up the search and after an appropriate "dead time"
arrives on station and starts the search from the common entry point.
The search pattern (field) is a series of a predetermined number (NL)
of parallel legs extending the length of the barrier (L) and spaced a
specified distance apart which is called the track spacing (TS). See
Figure 1. Probes are dropped along the legs of the field at intervals
called the drop interval (Dl). The field orientation is offset from the
barrier area by an angle u. The number of legs (NL) can be varied
within the restraints of aircraft endurance on station and stores
availability.
In the simulation, a set number of submarines transit the barrier
area on randomly selected courses, entering the area at uniformly random
points and at random times. The random quantities are generated with
the aid of the pseudo-random number generator on the electronic computer.
The entry point of the submarine was restricted to not less than 25 miles
from either end of the barrier. This guarantees that regardless of
course, the submarine will still be in the playing field after crossing
all legs of the barrier. A random number between and 1 from a uniform












entry point = 25 + (random number) x (L - 50).
The game time is divided into N equal intervals where N is the number
of submarines in a play of the game and the entry time of each sub-
marine is similarly computed from another uniform random variable. The
course is computed froms
course = 1.5708 + (0.5236) x (random number).
The course is in radians. This random number is taken from a normal
distribution of mean zero and variance one. This gives a normally
distributed random course with a mean of 90° (perpendicular to the
barrier area) and a variance of 30°.
The courses and positions of the transitors are then calculated
relative to the field, and the time and position each submarine crosses
each leg of the aircraft's pattern is computed. Each probe dropped is
then compared with the submarine's time and position of crossing that
particular leg to determine if a detection has occurred. If no detec-
tion is made, another probe is dropped one drop interval further along
the leg, the current time is computed and again each submarine is
interrogated to see if detection has occurred. This continues until
either the aircraft has reached the end of his pattern, a submarine is
contacted, or the allotted game time has expired. See Appendix I for
a flow diagram of the program.
Many variable states of nature or characteristics of an air dropped
store which could definitely affect the operational performance of the
system are not included as variables. It is desired to keep the speci=
fications general enough to be adaptive to widely varying system concepts,
If any limiting characteristic of a probe can be offset by a design or
engineering change, it is disregarded. Hence, there is no mention of
8

such items as rate of travel of the probe in air or water. Sea state
and visibility are not considered. No system is suggested for the probe
to signal a detection nor is a size limitation specified although either
of these can significantly affect the altitude, speed and/or flight path
of the aircraft.
A detection is assumed to occur if the probe is in the wake of the
submarine, and the wake at that position has not deteriorated to less
than the critical detection level (i.e., the time interval since passage
of the submarine is less than the persistence). Because of the assump-
tions made of neutral or positive buoyancy of the wake, instantaneous
response of the probe, and a vertical probe path, a detection will occur
if the aircraft is over any portion of the wake when he drops the probe.
The problem then can be reduced to two dimensions and a detection will
occur if the aircraft is in an interval of his flight path defined by:
(position submarine crosses that leg) + ^-(wake width) esc OC




















4.1 Evaluation of Non-critical Parameters
The model calls for twelve input parameters: the number of sub-
marines in the game, the sub speed, the aircraft speed, dead time re-
quired for a relief aircraft to arrive on station (DT), cycle time
between scheduled aircraft (CT), the game duration, length of legs (L),
number of legs (NL), track spacing (TS), field orientation (Q), width
of the detectable wake (WW), and persistence of the wake. Time would
not permit an exhaustive set of permutations of all the parameters, so
a set of runs was made to identify and assign values to some non-critical
parameters.
Each "run" consisted of six "plays" of the simulation. In the
first group of runs, a single parameter was varied on each play. In
this way, the effect of a change in the particular parameter is
directly observed since all the other inputs are kept constant. See
Appendix II. Plots of the effectiveness (ratio of the number of de-
tections to the number of transits) are used to detect any trend on
the variation of this parameter. Figure 3 shows the effect of varying
the angle of orientation of the field to the barrier area.
It should be noted that by eliminating Run 8 which combined a long
barrier with a depth of only two legs, u = .09 radians gave an overall
high value of effectiveness.
Figure 4 shows the results of varying the track spacing on five
runs. With the exception of Run 7, all the runs show peaks or in-
creasing trends at 12 miles. Other runs indicate 12 miles is also



























NO. L TS NL WW PERS DI SPD SYMBOL
2 150 15 A .2 2 1.0 15 +
5 150 15 6 .2 2 1.0 15 «
8 300 15 2 .2 2 1.0 15 •
12 250 12 A .2 3 1.0 7 A




























NO. L le NL WW PERS DI SPD SYMBOL
A 150 a A .4 3 .5 15 +
7 150 a A .2 3 .75 15 f
10 250 .09 A .2 3 .5 15 A
11 250 .09 A .2 3 .5 7 *
13 150 .09 A *2 3 .5 5 D
All runs use A/C SPEED = 150 knots, DT = 2 hours, CT = 8 hours,
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Run 14 varied the number of lege flown on a 300 mile barrier.
There was no pronounced peak and in light of Run 8, the value of the
300 mile barrier was questionable, so most of the runs were made with
4 legs and a shorter length.
The second group of runs held the inputs constant for each of
the six plays in every run, but parameters were changed between runs.
Appendix III Table 1 shows the results of the runs with a wake width
of 0.4 and 0.3 miles. Such a wide detection area makes most other
parameters insignificant but it should be noted that Run 3 showed a
sharp decrease in effectiveness. Run 3 differed from Run 6 only in
density of submarine traffic. Run 6 showed an effectiveness of the
system of 79.2$ against an average of one submarine every six hours.
Run 3, however, showed an effectiveness of only 4.6.8% against an
average of one submarine every three hours. Excepting Run 3, it
appears that with a wake width of 0.4 miles and a drop interval of
0.5 miles, tactics were unimportant. No further considerations were
made of wakes of this width. Run 3, however, showed that even with this
wide wake, the system could be saturated.
Appendix III, Table 2 summarizes the results of the runs using
a wake width of 0.2 miles. The runs are ordered by effectiveness,
and a definite pattern emerges. Runs longer than 250 miles in length
tend to lose effectiveness as shown by Runs 36 and 38. Reducing sub-
marine density has negligible effect. (See pairs 25 and 43, and 41
and 42.) Increasing the aircraft speed (see pair 30 and 39) also does
not appreciably alter the effectiveness. From these results, the




aircraft speed = 150 knots
dead time = 2 hours
cycle time = 8 hours
track spacing = 12 miles
field orientation = 0.09 radians
length of field = 250 miles
4,2 Optimization of Critical Parameters
With the established parameters determined by the aforementioned
runs, another set of runs was made in which the remaining parameters
(NL, DI, WW) were varied over three submarine transit speeds. These
results are shown in Appendix IV. As it would seem, the effectiveness
increases with an increase in the number of legs flown, but for more
than fours legs, the gain is smalll The difference between a two and
three hour persistence is small and inconsistent, implying that the
lingering of the disturbance is of less importance than the lateral
range in the range of parameter values considered. Consistently through-
out the set, the smallest drop interval gave the highest effectiveness.
Efforts to substitute more legs with a greater drop interval caused
a loss in effectiveness.
These results provide a guide for establishing specifications for
an aircraft=expendable probe system for use in barrier operations. Under
the assumptions made and the values of this example, appropriate specifi-
cations should assure that the barrier effectiveness will be near the
level indicated. That is, the probe must be able to detect the submerged
trail of a submarine within 0.1 mile on either side of its track for up
to two hours after submarine passage. Given that the probe is developed,
15

then the aircraft-probe system must be compatible with the total stores
requirements and must be able to meet the technical demands such as
rapid probe ejections, probe data interpretation, etc. The forecast
of a probable failure of the system to meet any one of these require-
ments would call for a reconsideration of the necessity of the barrier
or the effectiveness of other systems, and might suggest a rejection




There remains to be established a suitable scale for measuring
this system for comparison with other systems possibly working on
different physical principles but with the same objectives. Such a
scale might give measurements in terms of miles of barrier versus
number of skilled and/or unskilled personnel for a given level of
effectiveness. Another scale, which will be outlined in this paper,
is cost per day per mile of barrier for a given level of effectiveness.
There is no apparent "best" measure of effectiveness always applicable
to all systems, but the measure used should be determined by the
"current critical parameter" whether it be number of skilled personnel
available, vehicles on hand, money, or other factor.
Consider the employment of expendable probes herein described in
a cold war situation. It is reasonable to assume that the limiting
factor would be cost, and hence the comparison of systems to be used
to prosecute the barrier would be made on a cost basis for a given
effectiveness. Appendix IV indicates that the system could be reason-
ably expected to attain a level of effectiveness of about 80-85%. All
combinations of characteristics for a given set of sensitivity para-
meters can be explored to determine the best combination for any ratio
of costs.
Suppose the requirement were given to select a system for develop-
ment which could maintain a barrier of an undetermined length with an
effectiveness of about 80%. Contractor estimates and past experience
would be consulted and system operating costs would be approximated.
17

Assume these estimates could be made in the form:
aircraft operating costs = X dollars per hour on station
probe costs a Y dollars per unit store
jz dollars per day for DT = 2
readiness coat = /
Z' dollars per day for DT = 3
\
Included in the aircraft operating costs with the actual operating
costs are all the additional personnel, facility, and support costs
necessary to maintain the required level of aircraft coverage on station.
The probe costs include storage facilities, dispenser equipment, and
other related expenses. The readiness cost estimate represents the
daily increase in operating costs accompanying a state of readiness
necessary to support a reduced dead time requirement. So, for a given
level of effectiveness, the system costs would be:
system cost/day/mile = ( /j) X • (estimated hours on station
per day) + Y # (estimated stores dropped per day) + Z I.
From Appendix IV, the combinations of tactics which would give the
desired -level of effectiveness can be isolated and analyzed for variables
which would affect the system cost. This information is shown in Appen-
dix V.
In Appendix V, the aircraft requirements of the system are shown
in three categories. Category I requires an aircraft with sufficient
stores capacity and endurance to fly a six leg pattern dropping probes
at £ mile intervals. This corresponds to 3000 probes and 10.56 hours
on station at a speed of 150 knots. Category II requires four leg
patterns (2000 probes and 7.01 hours on station) and category III, three
legs (1500 probes and 5.23 hours on station). For each category, the
stipulated conditions of system sensitivity (persistence), state of
18

readiness (dead time), tactics (number of legs) and opposition (range
of transitor speeds) are posed and simulation data presented. From
this information, the expected cost of the system for each set of
stipulated conditions is made.
Appendix V indicates, as would be expected, that for each set of
stipulated conditions, an increase of the number of legs flown, which
would inherently increase the average on-station time and the number
of probes dropped, increases the effectiveness. For a given level of
effectiveness, however, tradeoffs may be beneficial. For example, if
the required level of effectiveness is 80%, and Z =» Z 1 + .83 X + 230 Y,
then a six leg pattern at a reduced readiness level (corresponding to
3 vice 2 hours dead time following a contact) would be less expensive.
With data in this form and updated estimates of aircraft and probe
costs, the planner has an analytical aid to assist him in making a





























































































































































































































.03 .06 ".09 .12 .15
2 150 15 2 4 15 .83 .16 .33 .83 .50 .50
5 150 15 2 6 15 .83 .58 .50 .75 .67 .50
8 300 15 2 2 15 .42 .50 .33 .33 .25 .33
12 250 7 3 A 12 .50 .75 .67 .67 .58 .50
4* 150 15 3
NL 6 TS
4 8 12 16 20 24
A .1 .92 1.00 1.00 .92 .92 1.00
7 150 15 3 A .1 .58 .75 .58 .75 .75 .75
10 250 15 3 4 .09 .83 .83 .92 .83 .83 .75





4 .09 .83 .83 .92 .75 .83 .67
14 300
TS e NL
2 3 4 6
12 .09 .67 .58 .83 .75 .92
All runs have A/C SPD = 250 knots, DT = 2 hours, CT =
miles.
All runs have WW = 0.2 miles except Run 4.
*WW = 0.4 miles in Run 4.

















86-90 26 150 8 250 12 .u .09 .5 7 4 89.0































-=75 3 150 8 250 15 .4 .1 1.0 15 8 46.8





EFF. RUN DT CT NL L PERS DI SUB SUBS EFF.
RANGE NO. SPD PER
DAY
25 2 8 4 250 3 .5 7 A 83.3
81-85 31 2 8 A 250 3 .5 7 A 83.3
A3 2 8 4 250 3 .5 7 2 80.5
35 2 8 A 250 3 5 15 A 79.2
36 2 8 4 250 3 .5 5 A 79.2
76-80 15 2 12 4 250 3 .5 7 A 79.2
27 2 8 A 250 3 .5 7 A 76. A
33 2 12 A 250 3 .5 7 A 76. A
42 3 8 A 250 3 .5 7 2 75.0
71-75 34 2 12 A 250 3 .5 15 A 75.0
41 3 8 A 250 3 .5 7 A 73.6
38 2 8 A 300 3 .5 5 A 71.8
29 2 8 A 250 2 .75 7 A 68.1
66-70 32 2 8 A 250 3 .75 7 A 68.1
17 3 8 A 250 2 .75 15 A 66.7
61-65 18 3 8 A 250 2 .75 7 A 62.5
28 2 8 A 250 2 .75 15 A 61.1
19 3 8 A *250 3 .75 7 A 59.8
51-60 30 2 8 A 250 3 1.0 7 A 54.3
39* 2 8 A 250 3 1.0 7 A 52.8
23 2 12 A 250 3 1.0 7 A 51.5
47.337 2 12 6 225 3 1.5 7 A
35-50 16 3 8 1 500 2 .5 7 A 45.8
20 2 12 1 500 3 .5 7 A 40.3-
*35 22 2 12 1 150 3 .5 7 A 30.5
21 2 12 3 225 3 1.5 7 A 25.0
TS = 12 miles, WW = 0.2 miles, Q = 0,09 radians on all runs
Aircraft speed = 150 knots except Run 39










NL PERS DI NL
5 KNOTS
NL PERS DI PERS DI
86-90 98 6 2 .5
j
88.9
62 6 2 .5 84.6
82 6 3 .5 83.3
53 6 2 .5 83.3
25 A 3 .5 83.3
93* 6 2 .5 83.3
81-85 52 6 3 .5 81.9
61 6 3 .5 81.9
48 4 2 .5 81.9
92* 6 2 .5 81.9
46 4 2 .5 80.6
73 A 3 .5 80.6
91* 6 2 .5 79.3
35 A 3 .5 79.3
88 3 2 .5 77.8
94 3 2 .5 77.8
97* 3 2 .5 77.8
















65 3 3 .5 76.4











EFF.15 KNOTS 7 KNOTS 5 KNOTS
NL PERS DI NL PERS DI NL PERS DI
75 6 3 1.0 75.0
71-75 95* 3 2 .5 73.6
44 4 3 .75 70.9
69 4 2 .75 68.1
80 4 2 1.0 68.1
63 6 3 .75 68.1
45 4 3 1.0 66.7
49 4 2 .75 66.7
70 6 3 1.0 66.7
66-70 74 6 2 1.0 66.7
79 4 2 .75 66.7
50 6 3 .75 65.3
59 4 2 .75 65.3
60 4 2 1.0 65,3
64 6 2 .75 65.3
72 3 1 .75 65.3
59.655 3 2 .75
56 4 3 .75 59.6
56-65 57
87 4 2 1.0
4 3 1.0 58.3
58.3
76 3 2 .75 58.3
78 4 1 1.0 57.0
54 3 3 .75 54.1
85 3 3 .75 54.1
51-55 68 3 2 1.0 54.1
89 3 2 .75 54.1
77 3 3 .75 52.8
48.690 3 2 1.0
<50 86 3 3 1.0 46.8
67 3 3 1.0 44.5
TS = 12 miles, WW = 0.2 miles, Q = 0.09 radians, A/C SPD = 150 knots,
CT = 8 hours, DT = 2 hours except where noted.




STIPULATED SIMULATION RESULTS EXPECTED
CONDITIONS cost/day/mile
CAT. PERS DT SUB RUN HRS. STORES EFF. AVE.
















5 62 20.77 5835 84.6

























5 73 16.33 4715 80.5
3 2 7 25 16.36 4660 83.3 81.0 16.41X+4704Y+Z
15 35 16.54 4738 79.3 250
II
5 58 16.60 4699 77.8
2 2 7 48 16.32 4672 81.9 80.1 16.41X+4690Y+Z
15 46 16.31 4698 80.6 250
5 65 13.95 3914 76.4
3 2 7 81 14.32 3907 77.8 77.3 14.16X+3935Y+Z
15 84 14.20 3983 77.8 250
5 66 13.89 3910 76.4
III 2 2 7 94 14.06 3920 77.8 77.3 14.07X+3943Y+Z
15 88 14.26 3999 77.8 250
5 95 12.08 3393 73.6
2 3 7 96 12.20 3430 76.4 75.9 12.18X+3413Y+Z'
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